Substances, Accidents, and Kinds: Some Remarks on Aristotle\u27s Theory of Predication by Lewis, Frank A.
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
12-29-1984
Substances, Accidents, and Kinds: Some Remarks
on Aristotle's Theory of Predication
Frank A. Lewis
University of Arizona, flewis@rcf.usc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient
Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lewis, Frank A., "Substances, Accidents, and Kinds: Some Remarks on Aristotle's Theory of Predication" (1984). The Society for




For Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy* 29 December 1984, 
DRAFT ONLY
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I. ACCIDENTS* KINDS* AND THE ANTI-PLATONISM OF THE CATEGORIES.
It is only fair to issue first a warning about the notion of predication that is the 
subject of this paper. For us* what is predicated is invariably a linguistic item. For 
Aristotle* by contrast* more often than not what is predicated is a metaphysical entity* and 
not linguistic at all. For simplicity* then* when I talk about predication here* I will always 
mean metaphysical predication* and will occasionally say so* parenthetically* as a reminder,
I begin* then* with a greatly oversimplified sketch of the theory of (metaphysical) 
predication that Aristotle finds in Plato* and means to oppose with the rival theory he puts 
forward in the Categories. In Aristotle's view* Platonic forms are all related in just a 
single way to their sensible subjects. Socrates (say) participates in each of his forms — in 
pallor* for example» in man* and the like. In the Platonic picture* as Aristotle sees it* 
there is no sense that some forms are more important than others to Socrates' continued 
existence.. The ultimate consequence of this view is the "bare substrate" ontology of the 
Timaeus. Sensibles are* to borrow Sellars' phrase* "leaky bundles of abstract particulars,"! 
made up of "copies" of forms* collected together in different regions of (otherwise 
featureless) space. Each bundle is leaky* because Plato supplies no principle to hold it 
together: he makes no room for the idea that some items in the bundle are essential for its 
existence* while others are merely accidental to it. Plato's theory* then* is what Code and 
Grice have called a theory of Having* in which sensibles Have all their properties* and Having 
is understood to be an accidental relation between a predicable and its  subject.
It is likely* however* that Plato has a different theory for how forms are related to 
their predicables. Forms are eternal and unchanging: they are not apt to alter their 
predicables. For forms* then, Plato has a theory of Being ("Izzing," in the jargon of Code and 
Grice), according to which forms Are what they are.
In the two halves of the theory just sketched* it is worth noting that sensibles Have all 
their predicables* and Are nothing at all* while forms Are what they are* and Have none of 
their predicables. Having is the lot of sensibles, and of them alone* while it is the sole 
prerogative of forms that they Are their various predicables. Plato, then, holds uniform 
theories of predication at the level of sensibles and at the level of forms — but true to the 
"two-world" ontology Plato defends, they are two different theories of predication at the two 
different levels.
A dichotomy of this sort is a plausible backdrop to the Third Largeness Argument Plato 
offers in the Parmenides. Arguably, Plato can use a distinction between the way in which 
sensibles take their predicables and forms take theirs* to fashion a way out of the regress 
which the argument threatens. The regress itself is contructed roughly as follows. Suppose 
that the term 'large' applies both to every member of a plurality, it, of sensibles that are 
large, and also to the form large that (by the One-over-Many assumption) is "over" all the 
members of It. Suppose, next* that we can form a new plurality of things that are large, It with 
large* whose members are just the members of it together with the form large. Suppose, finally, i
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that given this new plurality» t  with large» we must also introduce à new form» large-1» which 
is "over'1 all the members of It with large. If these further steps go through» then we are 
well on the way to an infinite regress of forms of large.
One means of blocking formation of the plurality it with large» and the subsequent 
introduction of large-Í» is ready to hand. Plato can maintain that there is an essential 
difference between it with large and the original plurality» K. it satisfies a homogeneity 
condition: when we say that each of the members of Æ is large» the 'is ' is being used in the 
same way in every case. There is no reason to suppose otherwise» for the members of it are all 
of the same type — they are all sensibles. The case will be quite different» however, if we 
admit higher-level pluralities, whose members include forms as well as sensibles. Any higher- 
level plurality, Plato may argue, will fail the homogeneity condition. In particular, all the 
sensibles that are members of it with large Have large ΐ-ness), but large itself Is large. 
Accordingly, it is  illegitimate to form such higher-level pluralities in the first place. 
Alternatively, if such pluralities are not objectionable in themselves, s till it is not 
plausible to invoke the One-over-Many assumption, and suppose that there exists a single form, 
for example, large-1, in virtue of which all the members of that plurality alike are large.
In a word, Plato can overcome the Third Largeness Argument of the Parmenides by claiming 
that in general, if a form *nd a sensible are both F. they are not F in the same way. In the 
jargon of Code and Grice, while the sensible is F (the Ordinary Language version) because it 
Has F(-ness), the form is F (again, the OL version) because it Is F.2
A major feature of Aristotle's strategy against Plato in the Categories is to collapse 
this dichotomy which Plato's theory of (metaphysical) predication attempts to make out between 
forms and sensibles. In Aristotle's theory, Socrates Is some of his predicables, but Has 
others. He Is what is essential to him, and he Has the rest. These different relations 
between Socrates and his various predicables form a large part of the motivation for the 
further ontological distinctions Aristotle draws in the Categories. Socrates is a primary 
substance: he is a lowest member of the category of substance, and he takes some of his 
predicables from higher up in that Same category. In the theory of Izzing and Having, he Is 
(a) man, (an) animal, and the rest. These last, meanwhile, are the secondary substances: they 
are non-individual, and “divisible" into their lower kinds (as animal, for example.» divides 
into the various species of animals), or into individuals (as man divides into Socrates,
Callias, and the rest).
There are also the non-substances, which stand in a very different relation to Socrates.
In A ristotle's terms, they are IN him rather than SAID OF him; in the jargon of Code,and 
Grice, they are predicables which Socrates Has, and not what he Is, hence they are accidental 
to him.
The cornerstone of this new, anti-Platonic theory of predication is the way in which these 
two kinds of (metaphysical) predication can combine in the single person of Socrates.
Aristotle responds to Plato's theory of the accidental relation between sensibles and their 
predicables» by arguing that Socrates, for example. Is some of his predicables» which are his 
kinds, and that he must first Be those things, before he can be a fit subject for the accidents 
which he Has.®
A ristotle's reworking of the Third Largeness Argument into the Third Man Argument is a 
symptom of this new interest in kinds. The problem of a thing's kinds is a distinctively 
Aristotelian one: for Plato, since a sensible has all its  predicables accidentally, there is 
no distinction between Socrates' kinds, and any others of his predicables. In Plato's theory, 
sensibles Have all their predicables. At the same time, invariably forms Are what they are.
For Plato, then, there is no special pleading involved in the choice of example, when he claims 
to  block any regress argument by saying that sensibles Have large(-ness), but that the form
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large itself Is Urge. But if Aristotle's view prevails» that Socrates Is some of hm  
predicables» for example» that he Is a man» then the regress argument takes on new life. For 
in Aristotle's view» sensible men and man alike Are mfn» so that any plurality that contains 
them all satisfies the homogeneity condition mentioned above. In this way» Aristotle's new 
theory of Izzing and Having fits  nicely within the dialectic of the regress arguments firs t 
the Third Largeness Argument» then later the Third Man Argument —* that both Plato and 
Aristotle bring to bear on the Platonic theory of forms.
II. ACCIDENTS AND KINDS IN THE METAPHYSICS — A REVERSION TO PLATONISM?
Aristotle's suggestion that an individual like Socrates both Has certain of his 
predicables» which are his accidents» and Is others» which are essential to him» marks a 
significant break with the earlier theory of (metaphysical) predication in Plato. At the same 
time» Aristotle also holds that the universal man too both Is certain of its  predicables — it 
Is» say» (an) animal — but at the same time Has other properties: for ex ampie» man Has pale» 
if some individual man is pale. Both ideas challenge the Platonic view that uniform theories of 
(metaphysical) predication prevail both at the level of sensibles and at the level of forms: 
for Aristotle» particulars and uni versais alike in the category of sifestance both Have some of 
their predicables» and Are others. His theory also changes Plato's view of the significance of 
the difference in levels. In holding that a particular Is certain of its  predicables»
Aristotle attributes to sensibles at least some measure of the invariance that for Plato was a 
prerogative exclusively of forms. Conversely» the idea that a universal can Have certain of 
its  predicables» challenges Plato's view that forms eternally and abidingly Are what they are. 
Finally» Aristotle also reverses Plato's choice of what to count as primary substance. For 
Plato, clearly, the primary realities are the forms. In Aristotle's theory in the Categories» 
however, universale even in the category of substance are counted as secondary substances, and 
the primary substances are instead the individuals, Socrates, Calilas» and the like.
Aristotle promotes individuals to the rank of primary substance, mainly under the 
influence of his theory of (metaphysical) predication. In the Categories, Aristotle's chief 
reason for counting individuals as primary substances is their role as subjects:
Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that
they are called substances most strictly. Categories 5, 2b37 ff.
This view gives Aristotle what we may call a monolithic view of the subject of (metaphysical) 
predication. In the final analysis» according to this view» the only real subjects of 
predication are primary substances. In some cases, it is obvious that the subject of a 
predication is a primary substance: Socrates» for example» is a primary substance» and he is a 
subject to both his kinds and his accidents. In other cases» however» an item is predicated 
of something other than a primary substance — for example» animal is predicated of man» or 
pale is predicated of animal. These further kinds of predication, which do nqt have individual 
substances as their subjects, are possible, only because they are founded in other predications 
whose subject is after all a primary substance. For example, pale is predicated of animal, 
only because some primary substance is both an animal and pale (strictly, it Is CanJ animal, 
and Has pale). In general, then, every predication can be analyzed ultimately in terms of the 
existence of some primary substance which is the subject for predicables.
In the Metaphysics, however» Aristotle's theory has undergone a radical metamorphosis. The 
most notable innovation» perhaps» is Aristotle's new choice for primary substance: it is 
evident that the primary substances are now (Aristotelian) forms»4 And the individual 
substance» Socrates» Callias, and the like undergoes a corresponding demotion. Socrates is 
analyzed as (in some sense) a compound of form and matter» and not Socrates himself but his 3
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form is now primary substance.
In addition to their role as primary substances, forms also have a part to play in the new 
Metaphysics theory of (metaphysical) predication. The principal passages are these:
Fort the rest are predicated of the substance (ovo toe)* but it  <is predicated) of the 
m atters Z3t i029a23-24.
<The subject) is i subject (vitóte € ^Tca) in two ways» either being a this} as the animal 
<is subject) to its  affections» or as the matter <is subject) to the actuality. Z13»
103Sb4-o,
For» that of which and the subject ( to  κ α θ ' ou lia t, To uiCOK € i.V-$ vov) differ in 
this, by being either a this or not being <a this): for example, what is subject to 
the affections is <a> man, both <his) body and <his) soul, and the affection is the 
musical or <the> pale ... In all cases of this sort, the subject (To ξο χα Τ ο ν) <is> 
substance; but in the cases that are not like this, but what is predicated is a 
certain form and a this (€>£os i t  Kckl To&£ Tu To VOV), the
subject (To ioxccTov) is matter and matter-like substance. Θ7, Í049a27 ff.
In these passages, Aristotle clearly abandons the monolithic view of the subject of 
(metaphysical) predication in the Categories, where individual substances are subjects for 
every predicable, in favour of the idea that there are twg irreducibly different kinds of 
subject for predication. Either an individual substance is subject to accidents, as before, or 
matter is subject to a form. Aristotle nowhere allows that there are more than these two kinds 
of subjects. Likewise, he nowhere suggests that the subjects which his theory does recognize 
can be subjects to other kinds of predicables than those indicated.&
At the same time, Aristotle also appears to accept a uniform notion of (metaphysical) 
predication in each of the two kinds of case his theory allows, Exactly one relation o f 
predication holds between an accident and an individual substance (the first is an accident of 
the second), and exactly one relation of predication connects a form with the matter of which 
it is predicated (the first supervenes on the second).
The relation of (metaphysical) predication itself is the union of the two subrelations 
just distinguished: the relation of predication holds between either an accident and its  
subject, or between a form and the matter on which it supervenes. In this sense, it is trivial 
that the same relation holds between the two kinds of. predicable and their respective subjects.
A more intriguing question concerns the two sub re latione. To what extent are these two like 
one another? Do they have even the same logical properties, differing only in their relata in 
the two kinds of case?
These questions are sufficiently important that it will do no harm to press them further.
The "two-stage1’ theory of (metaphysical) predication that appears in the Metaphysics in some 
ways can seem like a simple extension of the notion of cross-categorial predication in the 
Categories. Aristotle applies the idea that an accident is predicable of an individual 
substance to the analysis of the individual substance itself, which he sees as a compound of 
form and matter, in which in turn the form is predicated o f the matter. In each case, the 
subject Has its  predicable: for example, Socrates Has pallor, and these bricks and mortar Have 
the form of a house. Evidently, Having here is the union of two distinct subrelations, the 
accident-of relation, and the relation of supervention (more strictly, the union of the 
converses of these), that hold respectively between pallor and Socrates, or between the form of 
a house and the relevant bricks and mortar. But (again) what of the two subrelations 
themselves? To what extent do they have the same kinds of properties? How far should we press 
the parallel between these two cases of predication?
There are, I believe» a number of traps in supposing that the two cases of predication — 
where an accident is predicated of a compound substance» or a form is predicated of matter - -  
are entirely parallel. The comparison involves a degree of oversimplification - -  on some 
accounts» even outright misrepresentation — that we will shortly have to correct. Flawed or 
not, however, the comparison between the two kinds of case is vivid enough to be worth pressing 
as hard as we can, with a view to finding exactly the points at which i t  breaks down.
<i) Aristotle himself seems to promote the comparison with his first introduction of matter 
and form in the Physics. Aristotle uses his account of qualified change, in which for example 
Socrates turns pale, as the pattern for unqualified change, in which a substance comes to be. 
Socrates exists before becoming pale and may even exist after the change is reversed. He also 
exists while the change is in effect: it is Socrates who turned pale, but the same Socrates '* ' 
who now pale as a result of that change. In exactly the same way, Aristotle supposes there 
exists something, namely the matter, before the coming-to-be of a substance, which Has the 
privative form, which then comes to Have the positive form when the substance comes-to-be, .end 
which may even continue to exist even after the positive form is lost and the substance itself 
no longer exists. This account straightforwardly implies the analysis of the substance which 
comes-to-be as (in some sense) a compound of form and matter, entirely parallel to the 
accidental compound of Socrates with the accident pale, Socrates + pale for short, which 
results when Socrates turns pale.7
(ii) A second argument for assimilating the relation between a form and the matter of which it 
is predicated to that between an accident and its  subject substance, casts its  net somewhat 
wider, to include the whole history of Aristotle's account of an individual and its  kinds· In 
Plato's ontology, as we have seen, sensibles have predicates true of them only by virtue of 
participating in — that is. Having - -  the relevant predicables. This view leads ultimately to 
the "bare substrate" ontology of the Timaeus, in which likenesses of forms are reflected in 
(otherwise featureless) Space. In the Categories, by contrast, Aristotle seems to suggest that 
predicables can work in (roughly) Plato's way in application to sensibles» only if there are 
other, "subject-fixing" predicables that work in a different way. These subject-fixing 
predicables are just a thing's kinds, and in the early, Categories account of individuals and 
kinds, Aristotle holds that a particular substance, Socrates (say). Is firs t a man (he is 
essentially a man), but Has his various accidents (he is accidentally large, pale, and so on).
As his alternative to Plato's theory of accidental predication, therefore, in which likenesses 
of forms are Had by different regions of Space, Aristotle gives us the picture of a primary 
substance, "the same and one in number" in virtue of the predicables it  (essentially) Is, but 
also "receptive of contraries," Which it (accidentally) Has (Categories 5 ,4a l0 -ii).
In this earliest. Categories account, the notion of belonging to a kind is not susceptible 
of further analysis. As in Plato's account, the fact that Socrates Is (a) man involves an 
unanaly2ed relation (even if it is not Plato's relation) between a sensible and a universal.
That the relation holds is a brute fact, and not open to further philosophical explanation or 
analysis. (But Aristotle distances himself from the Platonic account, by insisting that the 
kind man, for example, is a secondary substance, and unlike Socrates and the other individuals 
that belong to the kind, a such and not a this.)
In the intermediate analysis, which in the Metaphysics appears side by side with the more 
radical, "full-strength" analysis, Aristotle retains reference to the kinds or secondary 
substances of the Categories, but no longer regards them as philosophically primitive.
Instead, he analyzes them as "compounds of this form and this matter, taken universally" 
(“universal compounds," for short).* Universal compounds, man, for example, and animal, and 
all those entities "that apply similarly to individuals, but universally" (T« ovTüís €K t Των 
(¿«θ' SicaOTa, Κ α θ ο χο ν  £ ', ZIO, 1035b28), are universal to compound material substances. By 
contrast with the secondary substances of the Categories, they are demoted in the Metaphysics 5
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to the status oí non-substances {Metaphysics ZIP* 1035b27-30).
In the -final Metaphysics analysis of individuals and Kinds» however» the story is quite 
different. Here» Aristotle shows us how to dispense altogether with reference to Kinds, and 
talK instead of form and matter, and of the relation of supervention. According to the full- 
strength Metaphysics analysis, Socrates Is (a) man if and only if the form of a man supervenes 
on a given matter (the matter which is, in fact, Socrates'matter).
Given the history of his debate with Plato, sketched earlier, Aristotle's full-strength 
analysis of individuals and Kinds in the Metaphysics may come as something of a shock. Suppose 
that Socrates is a man. On the new theory, this must be analyzed in terms of a certain form 
supervening on a certain portion of matter. That is, the matter Has the form in question. On 
this picture, apparently, Aristotle sees little  difference between the way in which an 
Aristotelian form stands to the matter of which it is (metaphysically) predicated, and the 
relation between an accident and its  parent substance. In effect, we may be tempted to 
conclude, it seems that Aristotle has reassimilated the logic of the predicate 'man' back to 
that of the predicate 'large.' Each is to be understood as Plato had suggested, in terms of a 
subject's Having the predicable in question.
In fact, I think, the argument just given is quite inconclusive. A comparison may help to 
see why. In A ristotle's earliest theory, from one point of view a single relation of 
(metaphysical) predication prevails between any predicable and its  subject. For example, both 
pale and man are predicated of Socrates, But it is trivial that this is the same relation in 
both cases. Predication here is the union of the two subrelations of Izzing and Having (more 
strictly, the union of the converses of these two), and the two different subrelations each 
have their own quite distinctive logical properties, A similar point may also apply to 
Aristotle's later theory. In the later theory, (metaphysical) predication is a matter of 
Having alone, or so I have argued, while Izzing drops out of the picture. A compound material 
substance Has its  various accidents, while at the same time, (a portion of) matter Has an 
appropriate form. Again, it seems, a single relation, namely Having, holds between any 
predicable and its  subject. But here too, this result may be trivial. Having now is itself 
the union of two subrelations, and the possibility is open that these two subrelations 
themselves have quite different logical properties. If, then, we are to say that Aristotle has 
actually assimilated the logic of 'man' to that of 'large,' we must find better arguments than 
the mere existence of Having as the union of the accident-of relation and the relation of 
supervention.
(iii) A final argument provides somewhat stronger support for assimilating the two cases of 
(metaphysical) predication. We know that an accident holds accidentally of the compound 
substance of which it is predicated. But (for reasons I will not try to develop here) a form 
is not even in a weakened sense the essence of, or the substance of, or mentioned in the 
definition of, the matter of which it is predicated.* There is at least some initial 
plausibility, then, to the idea that when a form is predicated of matter, the relation in this 
case too holds accidentally between the predicable and its  subject. It will follow that 
predication in the Metaphysics is in all cases an accidental relation between a predicable and 
its  subject.
The argument just given can be broadened within the context of a distinction between 
supervenient and constitutive form. Where an individual substance a is a compound of a matter 
m and a form Ψ» say that a * m + Ί*·10 Here, the form Ψ supervenes on m, but it  is constitutive 
of a itse lf — that is, of m + Ψ. Plausibly, Aristotle will want to deny essentialism for 
matter with respect to supervenient form. Suppose that a given matter, m, Has a certain form v 
(equivalently, that Ψ supervenes on m). Then plausibly, i t  is  possible that m should exist and 
yet not Have Ψ. For example, the bronze that is in fact the matter of this statue, and hence 
Has the form of a statue, might still exist even if the statue did not: that is, it might 6
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exist, yet tail to Have the -form of a statue. The relation of Having, then, between matter and 
form is an accidental relation. Or equivalently, the converse relation of superveniente holds 
accidentally between a form and the appropriate matter.
It is no objection to this account of the accidental character of the relation between 
matter and the form that supervenes on it, that Aristotle will also hold a different, 
essentialist principle for a thing with respect to its constitutive form. Thus, if a form Ψ is 
constitutive of something x — that is, for some m, x = m + ψ — then it is impossible that ± 
should exist, and yet Ψ not be constitutive of x. For example, the form of a statue is 
constitutive of this statue, and the statue could no longer exist if that form were lacking.
This essentialist principle holds for any form-matter compound, m + Ψ, whether it falls below 
the level of substance, that is, it is itself matter for some further application of 
supervenient form, or whether m + ψ is a compound material substance.
One further qualification is also worth noting here. In claiming that the relation 
between matter and the form that supervenes on it is an accidental one, I use the word 
"accidental" in the technical sense, that Ψ is accidental to j£, only if & can exist without Ψ.
I do not mean to deny that most often in nature, the connection between a matter and the form 
that supervenes on it is far from fortuitous. Suppose, for example, that an embryo is at the 
point in development where an animal capable of sensation is about to emerge. Then there 
already exists a collection of various uniform and non-uniform parts, which will be the matter 
of the sensate animal about to emerge, and merely awaits the final increment of 
ce t<?0 rl‘T‘ uK Ή. Clearly, it is not open to that matter to take on not Ψ v x rt e e ι κ η but some 
wildly different form, say the form of a table. There are perhaps just two choices open at 
this point: either the matter takes on ri, or the creature Fails to develop at
all, and instead dies.
In this sense, the matter in question “exhibits the urge for" its  appropriate form 
(Physics A9, Í92ai3-Í9). The prior forms incorporated into the embryo at the earlier stages of 
its  development are followed by still other forms which are progressively realized until the 
fully-developed creature emerges. It is helpful here to think of the forms progressively 
realized in the different objects in nature as arranged in seouences — for example, the 
sequence of forms realized in the development of a man, or a mollusk, or an oak-^ree. These 
sequences are in many cases overlapping, at least at the earliest stages. Very soon, however, 
the sequences begin to diverge, leaving little  if any room for variation in what comes later, 
if nature continues inimpeded. And in any given case, the parentage of a creature leaves 
determined from the very s ta rt the ultimate direction in which the embryo is headed, however 
unformed it is  in its  earliest stages. All of this is consistent with the idea that the form ψ 
which in the course of nature normally supervenes on a given matter & might not in fact do so, 
even though m itself continues to exist. The possibility of the sheer failure of the living 
creature to develop, but rather its  withering and dying, is sufficient to show that the 
relation between m and Ψ» however strongly "programmed" in nature, is  s till an accidental one 
in the sense defined.
So far, so good, then, for the view that the predication relation between an accident and 
an individual substance, and between a form and matter, is  alike in a t least this, that the 
relation is in both cases accidental. This idea is not without its  problems: I will try to 
dispel one argument against it, based on the so-called “homonymy" of matter, later in the next 
Section. Provisionally at least, however, we have some reason for supposing that in his new 
theory of (metaphysical) predication in the Metaphysics, Aristotle does mean to assimilate to 
some degree the relation between a form and the matter on which it supervenes to the relation 
between an accident and its  parent substance. But how far is he willing to carry this 
assimilation? And supposing that some degree of assimilation is present, must we conclude that 
the new theory of predication in the Metaphysics represents a reversion to the kind of Platonic 
picture that Aristotle had earlier affected to deplore? In the Categories* Aristotle insists
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'that Socrates must -first Be something» before he can Have his various accidents. But if 
Aristotle no longer sees a need for a theory of lazing, what hope can there be for a proper 
account of Socrates' status as a member of a Kind? If Having is the only relation of 
(metaphysical) predication Aristotle leaves room for in the Metaphysics» how does he avoid the 
"bare substrate" ontology for which he earlier takes Plato to task?
Proper answers to these questions require us to set the proper distance between the 
relation of form to matter, and that of its  accidents to a compound material substance. In 
Section III immediately following, I discuss some points a t which the two cases oí predication 
diverge. On a more positive note, finally, in Section IV, I turn to the account of 
individuals, accidents, and Kinds, that Aristotle's new theory provides.
III. SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO HALVES OF ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME. -
We can begin by noticing some of the ways in which the two halves of the system of 
(metaphysical) predication differ: this will help moderate the degree of assimilation between 
the two cases of predication argued for in the previous few pages.1 1 Despite the recourse to a 
notion of Having in both halves, there are subtleties in the segment in which form is 
predicated of matter which make it look much less like the half which contains compound 
substances and their accidents. First, the individual substance holds a symmetrically opposite 
position in the two systems of predication. We can "spatialize" Aristotle's theory by 
supposing that the relation of predication holds downwards» from a predicable above to its  
subject below (Aristotle himself encourages the spatial metaphor — see, for example, 
Metaphysics oc2, ?94ai9-22 and Γ4» i007b9; the metaphor is in any case already present in the 
very word, 'subject,' as in the Greek word it translates). Suppose further that the part of 
Aristotle's theory that deals with substances and accidents is "positioned" above that dealing 
with matter and form. Now in the upper half » the individual substance is at the bottom, for it 
is the subject of accidents. But it is at the top of the lower half, for it is analyzed as the 
result of (metaphysically) predicating a "substantial" or "last" form of proximate matter, and 
the proximate matter in turn is analyzed as the result of predicating still other form of still 
other matter, and so on down through the different lower levels of organization in the matter 
of the thing, until we come to prime matter at the very bottom.
The complexity of the lower as opposed to the upper half of A ristotle's system makes a 
second, important difference between the two halves: we will make more of this difference 
later in the next Section. Yet a third difference concerns the direction of ontological 
priority in the two halves. In the lower half, the direction is from the top to the bottom.
The compound substance itself and the "substantial" or "last" form that is constitutive of it 
at the very top, come second and first respectively in ontological priority. Thereafter, we 
proceed "down" in the scheme, through the lower levels of organization in the matter of the 
thing, and through correspondingly lower levels of ontological priority, until last and least 
we reach prime matter. In the upper system of substances and accidents, however, ontological 
priority goes in the reverse direction, with compound substances at the bottom prior to the 
accidents that are predicated of them from above. Since the direction of priority is opposite 
in the two systems, but the subject is lower in both, there follows the different ontological 
Standing that attaches to the subject in the two halves. Hence the inadequacies of the subject 
criterion for ontological priority, once it is transplanted from the single-stage system of 
(metaphysical) predication in the Categories to the two-stage analysis in the Metaphysics.
The next point is a matter of some controversy. Yet another subtlety is said to help 
differentiate further the upper system of substances and accidents from the lower one of matter 
and form. In the upper system, a compound substance is fully constituted as a member of a kind 
independently of its  particular accidents. An individual substance Is a member of its  given
kind — even if ultimately this is analyzed not in terms of l22ing, but of a given matter's 
Having a given form — before it can Have its  various accidents. In the lower stage, however, 
the relation between form and the matter of which it is  (metaphysically) predicated is far more 
complex. The trouble begins with Aristotle's doctrine of the homonymy of the bodily parts.
The form of a natural object does not exist unless it is appropriately enmattered, as Aristotle 
frequently insists. Equally, however, in natural objects at least (artefacts may be an 
exception), a given specimen of matter is what it is o^wvvUtos,"in name only/ in the absence 
of the appropriate form.1 2  Both sides of the interdependence are stated strikingly at de Gen.
An, Bi, 735aó-S:
no soul will be present in anything else except, naturally, in that gf which it is 
<the soul>, and no part <among the bodily "parts”> will exist if it does not 
participate <in the appropriate soul>, except homonymously, like the eye of a corpse.
How exactly is matter dependent on form, according to the doctrine of the homonymy of 
matter? According to the homonymy doctrine, an eye, for example, cannot exist outside a living 
animal — a being with ΨΙΉΤΙ 'Π, Without ri, the various sense-organs are
at best sense-organs in name only. But Ψ Ti ai.o#*riYLk: "Ί is as form to the various sense-organs 
as matter: ψ œ t o Θ'ΠΤ tk  η supervenes on the different sense-organs. I t follows, apparently, 
that the existence of the full-fledged sense-organs is in some way dependent on the form that 
is supervenient bn them. This result - -  if it can be trusted — puts Aristotle directly in 
conflict with the anti-essentialist principle sketched in Section II above. Aristotle appears 
to be committed to saying that in this case, the material half of a form-matter compound exists 
in the full sense, only when the compound itse lf exists. Accordingly, the matter on which ψτ/χ^ϊ 
οίίΟβ'ΜΤ Lk: "Π supervenes Has a predicable it could not possibly fail to Have. And by this, we mean 
that it  would no longer exist, or would exist only homonymously, if it failed to Have the form 
in question.
This argument is not in fact sound. Aristotle's doctrine of the homonymy of the bodily 
parts is designed to show that the constitutive form of an eye, for example, is not to be 
equated with simply its  structure, but must also make room for the function of an eye — its  
various £pya¡ koü· ls (de P, An. Bi, 646b 13, cf. 647a24), the different "works and doings"
that comprise its  behaviour as a part with a particular function within some larger System.
Our notion of the constitutive form of a thing, then, is not exhausted by the structural 
properties of the thing, but must also take account of the role i t  occupies in the teleological 
scheme of things.
Within this framework, what Has some suitable portion of ψυχ^ι uc ri is not my eye in
the full sense, but my homonymous eye: something with the structural properties of an eye, but 
which is not an eye in the full sense — is not a living eye. Clearly, an eye in this reduced 
sense can continue to exist even in the absence of ψ νχή  a^.o&W t,k '0. My homonymous eye, then, 
does not fail A ristotle's anti-essentialist principle with respect to supervenient form.
At the same time, an appropriate portion of Ψ νχ'Π œt<? tk  Π is the constitutive form of my 
eye in the full sense of 'eye.' And my eye properly so-called will not exist except in the 
presence of L-k η. So the principle of essentialism for a thing with respect to its
constitutive form is also upheld in this case.
If these arguments are right, we do not have to give up the idea that the matter is fully 
constituted antecedently the arrival of the next complement of supervenient form,
A ristotle's doctrine of the homonymy of matter is quite consistent with his anti-essentialism 
for matter and supervenient form. As Aristotle's anti-essentialist principle demands, a given 
case of matter is fully constituted as what it Is, before it can Hsve the next level of 
supervenient form. On this point at least, then, the analogy between the two halves of 
A ristotle's system of predication does not break down.
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IV. ACCIDENTS AND KINDS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NEW THEORY. ;
ί turn finally to the positive account o f the individual substance, his accidents) and his 
Kinds* that the new theory of ΐmetaphysical) predication provides. It is fundamental* above 
all* not only that the two systems of predication are different in the various ways suggested* 
but also that they are two1 ® — that they are not collapsed together into one great scheme in 
which every successive'modification is regarded as yet another imposition of form* or equally 
seriously* every modification is merely an accidental variation of.an underlying matter, I 
take these two points in order.
(i) Not every difference for Aristotle is a difference in Kind* To see why not* we can begin 
with the obvious contrast concerning the relative complexity of the two halves of. Aristotle's 
scheme. Suppose that an individual substance* ¿* can be analyzed as a compound of proximate 
matter and "substantial" or "last" form* m1 + Ψ*. It is overwhelmingly likely* as we have 
already seen* that m * itself (which is here the .subject for Ψ i ) is a compound of matter and 
form* m£ + Ψ2 . Thus* a = m1 + Ψ1 * (m£ t  Ψ£) + Ψ1. And m£ itse lf may be a compound of s till 
other matter and form* rn® + Ψ®, so that a “ m1 + Ψ1 =.(m® + H,£ ) + Ψ1 = i(m® + Ψ®) + ψ£) + ψ ΐ. 
The analysis of a* then* takes this form (where ' t '  indicates the "downwards" relation of 
predication):
ψ ΐ Ψ 1 φ ΐ ψ ΐ
" t l  . ■ Φ
m i < ψ 2  . . . . < ψ 2
■ ■ φ ■ . φ
m £ )




In the top half of the scheme* by contrast» there is just a single layer of predication* 
consisting of all the compound material substances* which are subject to all their various 
accidents. There are no more layers than this. Suppose* for example* that the substance* a* 
is subject to the accident, Φ i . Then there exists the accidental compound of a with Φ1 * a +
Φ ? * for short. Suppose that a is also subject to the second accident* Φ®, Then there exists a 
second accidental compound* a t  Φ®. But we cannot infer from this the existence of a compound 
of an accidental compound with an accident; there is no such entity as (a + Φ * ) + Φ®, The top 
half * then, looks like this:
φΐ φ2 φ 3  . . . , φη
4 φ · φ φ
a





a) ) , )
The two halves of A ristotle's scheme together detail the steps by which different forms 
supervene in order on successively more complex layers of matter, until we reach a fully-formed 
member of a kind, which thereafter is a subject for accidents. Kinds in the proper sense of 
the term exist only at the top of the lower half of the scheme, in connection with the final 
layer of forms, and immediately before the layer of compound material substances and their 
accidents. But it will be useful to speak of kinds also in the lower-level cases, in 
connection with lower-level forms. For example, if ψ 1 is  the form associated with a 's kind, 
there is also some lower-level kind associated with ψ 2 , a still lower kind associated with Ψ ®, 
and so on. Examples of such lower-level kinds include bone, blood, bronze, and the like.
Two rules involving kinds (both kinds proper, and also lower-level kinds) hold throughout 
Aristotle's scheme — but with just one exception in each case, at opposite extremes of the 
scheme. According to the first principle, with one exception,
(1? Subjects belong to kinds.
In the lower half of Aristotle's scheme, with one exception, if a form supervenes on a subject, 
then there exists some other form that is constitutive of that subject. For example, Ψ 3 






That is, mi 5 IE2 + Ψ2 , where Ψ2 is the form associated with m1 's  (lower-level) kind. And in 
the top half of the scheme, an accident is predicated of a compound material substance, only if 
there is a form that is constitutive of that substance, and is the form associated with its  
kind. For example, Φ1 is an accident of a, while the form ψ1 is constitutive of a, and is the 
form associated with a 's kind. At this level, the principle is sometimes stated as the 
principle of "Izzing before Having," discussed in earlier Sections: far example, Socrates Has 
pale, only if he Is first (a) man. The principle of "Izzing before Having," then, is a special 
case of a more general principle that holds throughout Aristotle's scheme, with one single 
exception.
The exception is prime matter, a t the very bottom of the entire scheme. Prime matter is 
not itself a compound of any further matter and form, and hence it has no constitutive form. 
The exception is no surprise, since the rule is an anti-bare-substratum rule, and prime matter 
is at least in the properly qualified sense a bar# substratum.1 4 The failure of the rule in 
this case puts an end to the sequence of progressively lower-level predicables, predicated of 
increasingly lower-level subjects which are themselves compounds of a subject with a
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predicable» where that subject in turn is analyzed as à compound of still some other subject 
and some other predicable. The sequence ends when we reach a final step at which there exists 
a subject which is not itself analyzed as a compound of some other subject with some other 
predicable.
A second rule holds throughout Aristotle's scheme except at the very top. With one 
crucial exception»
(2) Predicables make a difference in kind.
Throughout the lower half of the scheme, i f  a form is predicated of a subject, then the 
resulting compound has that form as its  constitutive form, and thanks to it, is a member of 
some (perhaps very low-level) kind. For example, Ψ2 is predicated of m£ , and Ψ2 is 
constitutive of the resulting compound, m1 (= m® + ψ£), and is the form associated with its  
kind:
ψΐ
The exception, as predicted, is at the very top of the scheme. The accident Φ 1 » for example, 
is predicated of the compound material substance, a, but the resulting compound, a + Φ1 » is not 
itse lf a member of any further kind. This exception puts an end to the upwards sequence of 
forms, introducing ever-more-complex kinds, and allows instead the introduction of a layer of 
predicables of a different character, which are accidents.
With this step, we reach the point with which we began this part of the discussion: not 
every modification is the imposition of yet another layer of form, and not every difference is 
a difference in kind. Interestingly, it is not enough to ensure this result to insist simply 
on a division between upper and lower halves in Aristotle's scheme. It is essential also that 
there is only a single layer of predicables in the upper half of the system, and that it does 
not contain any further predicables» at a level beyond that we stipulate to be the last. 
Aristotle is firm that the sequence of forms involved in the constitution of a given compound 
material substance is bounded at both ends, and the single exceptions to each of the two rules 
given are intended especially to guarantee this result. With these single exceptions, however, 
the two rules otherwise hold throughout the system, from top to bottom. It follows given this 
last point that there must be a single laver of predicables in the top half of the system, or 
the sequence of forms is not bounded at the upper end after all.
One argument is relatively trivial, Thus, consider the hypothesis that, contrary to what 
has been supposed here, there is a further level of predicables beyond Φ1. For example, 
suppose that the accident, Φ*> is predicated of a + Φ*. By rule (2), except at the single level 
of Φ1 » predicables make a difference in kind. Accordingly, the compound (a + Φ * ) + Φ* is 
itself a member of some new, unwanted kind.
This result is easily avoided by reformulating more generously the exception to rule (2).
Wé can say that the rule holds only in the lower half of Aristotle's scheme, and that 
predicables never make a difference in kind in the upper half of the scheme, however many 
different levels of predicables exist in that half. A second difficulty, however, involving 
rule (i), is not so easily turned aside. Suppose (again) that Φ2 is predicated of a + Φ1. By 
rule (i), with the exception of prime matter, subjects belong to their own distinctive kinds.
It follows that a + Φ1 too, since it is subject to Φ 2 » must also be a member of its  own kind 
after all.
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To prevent this unwanted proliferation of kinds, and in place of the wholesale reworking 
of the two rules given, our best recourse is simply to deny that an accidental compound is 
itself a proper subject for accidents. If Socrates + pale, for example, is not a subject for 
accidents, then we cannot use rule (1) in order to argue that Socrates + pale is a member of 
some new kind. Again, if Socrates + pale is not a subject for accidents, then we have no way 
of obtaining higher-level accidental compounds, (Sócrates + pale) + musical, and the rest, 
which by rule (2) are themselves members of kinds.
On this view, what it takes to halt the upwards sequence of forms and their associated 
kinds includes not merely the division between upper and lower halves in the scheme of 
predication, but also the further idea that in the top half, there is only a single layer of 
predicables. And in fact, Aristotle insists that the pale is musical, for example, or the 
musical is pale, only because both musical and pale are accidents of some man. But pale 
Socrates (say) — that is, Socrates + pale — cannot itse lf be the subject of some further 
accident.1 E
(ii) Aristotle also rejects the conclusion that every predicable is merely an accident of a 
single substratum. Aristotle's reductio argument in Metaphysics Z3, using the old subject 
criterion for primary substance, attempts to portray a thing's accidents and the forms that 
help make i t  up as all alike merely accidental modifications of a single underlying subject.
In fact, however, no such single subject exists. In arguing for a single underlying subject in 
Z3, Aristotle seems to rely on the idea that the relation, "x is predicated,of y /‘ is 
transitive fi029a23-24), but this idea is clearly mistaken. For example, the accidents of a 
compound material substance are the accidents of that substance, but (despite what Aristotle 
says at 1029a23-24> that very substance is not itself predicated of anything, let alone of some 
underlying m atter,1 6 It does not follow, then, that the accidents are predicated of an 
underlying matter, Again, mn at -the bottom of Aristotle's scheme is supervened on by Ψπ, and 
the resulting compound, mn + ψη (= mn”*) is supervened on by ψ0” 1. But (again) these premisses 
are not enough to show that mn is supervened on by Ψ1"1"*.1 ? In general, then, there is not 
obviously any way to show that mn is subject not only to Ψη, but also to Ψη“*,..., and 
finally v 1, let alone also to Φ1 and the other accidents of a thing.
Aristotle's new theory, then, does not show that he has given up his view of individuals 
as stable members of kinds, or that he is about to lapse instead into a Platonic, "bare 
substrate" ontology. But he now draws very differently the distinction between "subject- 
fixing" predicables or kinds on the one hand, and the accidents of a thing on the other. In 
the Categories, the contrast is made in terms of a distinction between two different kinds of 
predication: a substance Is its subject-fixing predicables, but it Has its accidents. In the 
Metaphysics, by contrast, Aristotle offers a distinction between two kinds of predicable, forms 
and accidents, which he distributes between the two different halves of his scheme of 
(metaphysical) predication. Forms ace predicable of matter: the result, finally, is a 
finished substance, which is a member of a given kind, and hence a fit subject for accidents.
The key to Aristotle's account of the individual substance, complete with both its 
accidents and its  kinds, lies with the way in which these two parts of his system of 
predication interact. The two halves of the system are separated one from the other, but only 
with the proviso that a t the same time, there exists a point of intersection between the two, 
occupied by the individual members of kinds. An individual substance lies at the point at 
which a thing is completely fashioned as a member of its  kind, thanks to the lower half of the 
system of predication; it is accordingly a fit subject for accidents, which accrue to it 
through the workings of the upper half of the system. How do we decide which predicables are to 
count as accidents, and which as forms? There is a sense in which the distinction between 
accidents and forms is arbitrary — it comes simply wherever we put the division between the 
last set of predicables and all its  predecessors. From this perspective, the one crucial
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condition is that there should not be any -further predicables* at a level beyond that we 
stipulate to be the last. As Furth has emphasized* identifying precisely which predicables 
fall on which side of the divide between the two halves of the system in any given case is not* 
most liKely* the task of metaphysics but rather (for example) biology in the case of a 
biological substance* and differently for substances of different* non-biological kinds. It is 
sufficient simply* as we have seen* that metaphysics should tell us that such a transition 
point between the two halves of the system exists* wherever in fact that point turns out to be 
located.
The key role in this shaping of the individual substance* on the road to becoming a fit 
subject of accidents* is played by form. Form* matter* and the relation of supervenience 
replace membership in a kind as the more nearly basic notions in Aristotle's theory. In the 
intermediate Metaphysics theory* the notion of a kind* which was primitive in the Categories* 
is analyzed in terms of form and.matter (ZiO, 1035b27-30* Zii, 1037a6-7), In the full-strength 
analysis* accordingly* the fact that Socrates is a man, for example* is explicated not by 
reference to a relation between Socrates and a kind, but in terms of the supervenience of form 
on matter.
Form is also involved in settling what constitutes sameness or difference in kind. For 
example* does being musical* or being male, make Socrates a member of a different kind from a 
person who is female* or unmusical? Again, as we have seen* we look to form to provide an 
answer. In fact* form is indifferent to the differences in question* and hence* they are not 
differences in kind but accidents, and predicated not of the matter but of the compound 
material substance.1 s In other words* we are at the point of transition from the lower to the 
upper half of A ristotle's scheme.
This view of the primacy of form repairs a difficulty in Aristotle's earlier theory. In 
the Categories» the individual substance is primary substance* despite its  unacknowledged 
dependence on its  kinds* which Aristotle regards as (merely) secondary substances.1 * The new 
theory of form removes this discrepancy. For in the Metaphysics» sameness or difference of 
form is what justifies the ways in which we group things into kinds* and at the same time* 
appropriately* form is also primary substance.^o
NOTES
1. Wilfred Sellars* “Aristotle's Metaphysics: An Interpretation*" in Philosophical 
Perspectives» Springfield* Illinois 1967» p. 77.
2. Further hints of the idea that, in contrast to sensibles, forms Are what they are, appear 
in the Sophist. Plato writes:
May we now be bold to say that that which is not unquestionably is a thing that has a 
nature of its  own — just as the tall was tall and the beautiful way beautiful* so 
too with the not-tall and the not-beautiful ~  and in that sense that which is not 
also* on the same principle* both was and is what is not* a single form to be 
reckoned among the many things that are? 258b9-14* after Cornford's translation.
Cf. the discussion of the two uses of 'is ' in Michael Frede* Praedikation und Existenzaussaoe. 
Goettingen 1967.
3. The point has been stressed most recently by Code: Alan Code* “On the Origins of Some 
Aristotelian Theses About Predication»" in James Bogen and J. E. McGuire* eds» How Things Are: 
Studies In Predication (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1934). Similar points are made* for example* by
G. E. L. Owen* "The Platonism of Aristotle*" Proceedings of the British Academy (1965)* 138*
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and M. J. Woods, "Substance and Essence in Aristotle," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
75 (1974-75), 178.
4. The textual evidence on the new choice of form as primary Substance in Metaphysics Zeta is 
unequivocal. We have this bald statement in Z7:
By form, I mean the essence of each thing and the primary substance. Z7, 1032b 1-2.
In a number of other places, Aristotle identifies form as substance tout court, and leaves off 
the qualification, "primary": for example, ZS, 1033bi7^18, Z10, 1035b 14 ff, Zli, 1037a25, 29 
(but see a28‘), Zli, 1041b7-9 (Ross' text [Ross 1924, Vol. II, p. 2243). But the omission does 
not cast doubt on the identification of form with primary substance: perhaps more often than 
not throughout Metaphysics Zeta, 'substance' is shorthand for 'primary substance.' In Zeta 3, 
next, Aristotle argues that form is prior to matter, and prior too to the compound of form and 
matter <1029a5-7i 1029a29~30 adds that the compound is prior to the matter). And in Z8, 
Aristotle explains how the primary substance, that is, form, and the compound substance are 
related:
the compound < sub stance > Cfl o V V OXOs) <is> that which is spoken of in accordance with 
("gets its  name from," Ross) it O  the form3. ΖΘ, 1033b 17-18.
In Eta 3, finally, Aristotle explains that kind terms in general, 'house,' for example, or 
'animal,' are often ambiguous between terms for the compound substance, and terms for the form. 
Such uses are to be explained by the notion of focal meaning, where (presumably) the use to 
pick out the form is primary, and the other peripheral uses are to be explained in terms of it.
5. This statement of Aristotle's theory is not without problems: see note 16 below.
6. In the ontology of the Metaphysics, either an accident is (metaphysically) predicated of an 
individual substance, or a form is (metaphysically) predicated of matter. Given this theory, 
what becomes of the view from the Categories that a single kind of entity is subject for every 
predicable, and that this entity is primary substance? This question is raised in Metaphysics 
Zeta 3, where Aristotle experiments with the idea that matter is subject to everything, both to 
accidents and to forms. The upshot of A ristotle's discussion is that the "subject" criterion 
for primary substance from the Categories cannot stand as is. For, the criterion is designed 
to pick out a single kind of entity as subject for everything, and hence as primary substance; 
but in the Metaphysics theory, as we have seen, Aristotle holds that there are two irreducibly 
different kinds of subject, and no such single subject exists. On this topic, see further in 
Section IV below.
7. On the topic of accidental compounds, see Frank A. Lewis, "Accidental Sameness in 
Aristotle," Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) 1—36, and Gareth Matthews, "Accidental Unities," in 
M. Nussbaum and M. Schofield, eds, Lanouage and Logos, 223-240. The '+' notation in the text 
stands for the operation of compounding, due to Kit Fine, which I take to be primitive in 
Aristotle's theory. Other associations which this same notation may have in other contexts 
should be disregarded.
3. ZiO, 1035b27-30, Zli, 1037&6-7, and perhaps 28, 1033b25-26 (but see Ross 1924 on 1033blé).
9. These points are discussed at length in Frank A. Lewis, "What is Aristotle's Theory of 
Essence?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Supplementary Volume X, 1984, 89-131,
10. On the '+' notation here, see note 7 above.
11. the  discussion in this and the next paragraph and in parts of Section IV below covers
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ground also traversed by Montgomery Furtb: points at which I am particularly endebted to 
Furth's account are detailed in later notes.
12. This is Aristotle's doctrine of the homonymy of severed parts (Metaphysics ZiO, 1035b23-25, 
Zii, 1036b28-32, Z16, 1040b5-16, and elsewhere in Aristotle» Meteor. ¿12» 389b3i-390b2» De An. 
Bi, 4i2bi8-22, de Part. An. Ai, 640b34-64ia5, al8 ft, and ¿ i Gen. An. A19, 726b22-24, Bi, 
734b24-27,735a7-8>. For the objection to the accidental character of the relation between 
matter and the form that supervenes on it based on the doctrine of the homonymy of matter, the 
reader should consult the subtle arguments of J. L. AcKrill, "Aristotle's Definitions of 
Psyche." reprinted in Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji, editors. Articles On Aristotle, 4.
Psychology and Aesthetics, pp. 65-75. Ackrill also enters a second reservation regarding the 
use of the form-matter model, in the case of compounds formed by the process of 1* s, but 
space does not permit discussion of this point here.
13. This point has been emphasized by Furth.
14. Prime matter is "bare" only in the qualified sense, that there is always some form which 
prime matter Has, but it is not itself a compound of form and matter, that is, prime matter has 
no constitutive form.
15. The examples and the reasoning are both borrowed from Metaphysics Γ4. 100?a33 ff. where 
Aristotle argues that there are no "upwards" chain of accidental predications, for in fact, "no 
more than two combine" (bi-4), that is, any sequence defined by the relation, "x is an accident 
of X»" has at most two members. As for the chances of a + Φ1 as a subject for predicables,
"not everything makes up one thing" (biO). Cf. also An. Po. A4, ?3b6, 7, A22, 83a2, 10 ff, An.
Pr. A26» 43a35, and Lewis (note 7 above), p. 15 and n. 13.
16. 1029a23-24 is quoted in Section II above. Aristotle uses the term Ov<? ι α '  ambiguously 
here, first for the compound material substance, which is a subject to accidents, then for 
substance in the sense of form. In fact, only substance in this latter sense is predicated of 
matter — and this not of any matter, but only of the proximate matter.
17. It is relevant here to notice that there are two different relations, "x is the matter of 
χ," One is a relation between a matter, mif and the compound, m* + ψ*, of which it is (in some 
sense) a part: this relation is transitive. The other matter-of relation holds between m1 and 
Ψ1, and this relation is clearly not transitive. The temptation to think that, contrary to 
what has been urged in the text, the supervened-on-by relation is transitive, may come from 
identifying that relation with the second of these different matter-of relations, and then 
falsely inferring from this that it shares the logical properties of the first.
18. Cf. the discussion earlier in this Section. Aristotle himself takes up the point in 
Metaphysics 19.
19. On this point, see Montgomery Furth, "Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances,1 
Journal of Philosophy LXXV (1978), pp. 624-646» esp. p. 631.
20. Work on the topics covered in this paper was supported in part by an A.C.L.S. Fellowship 
funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, hereby gratefully acknowledged. An earlier 
version of the paper benefitted from a hearing at the University of Texas at Austin in Spring 
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